INTRODUCTION
On July 4, 2006,just five days after the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,' prosecuting attorneys Professor Neal Katyal of Georgetown University Law Center and Lieutenant Commander Charles Swift flew to Guant~namo Bay, Cuba (Guantdnamo) to meet their client, Salim Hamdan, and tell him the Supreme Court declared the military commissions he was to be tried under unconstitutional. 2 While explaining their seminal victory to Hamdan, they said that "[i]n 50 to 100 years, law students will be reading this case and reading your name."' Hamdan responded that "[m]aybe I'll change my name. I just want to go home." 4 While Hamdan's resignation is understandable considering his five-year confinement at Guantnamo, the legal community believed Katyal and Swift did the impossible. 5 They won a case striking down a judicial system that deprived its participants of constitutional rights. 6 In eight Military Commissions Instructions (MCI No. 1-8), the Department of Defense (DOD) delineated procedures to guide the The charge murder by an unprivileged belligerent illustrates the arbitrary nature of the military commissions. The legal situation surrounding the "War on Terror" and the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon has created questions unanswerable through codified law." The issues became more complex as President George W. Bush continued to use war powers without a formal declaration of war,' which caused confusion regarding whether military law would be applicable during the "War on Terror."15
Murder by an unprivileged belligerent, like the charge of conspiracy used against Hamdan, is an unprecedented war crime absent from international law. International law governing the use of force in armed conflict is traditionally termed jus in bello ("the law of war"), or more frequently "the law of armed combat," and constitutes part of United States law.' This framework comprises the body of rules that governs hostilities between States and hostilities within States.
Customary international law plays a significant role in the law of war. Various laws-of-armed-combat conventions compose a body of customary law that binds even non-parties to the conventions." 14 See STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE TO THE COMMANDANT OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS, "TIME OF WAR" AND THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, http:// sja.hqmc.usmc.mil/jam/time%20of%20war.doc (last visited Apr. 15, 2007) (declaring that since September 11, 2001, there has not been a declaration of war by Congress "nor a special finding by the President that UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] `Time of War' exists"). 13 See id. 16 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980) (integrating international law into the U.S. common law by reviewing the history surrounding the adoption of the United States Constitution). See generally UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § (A) (1.2), at 2 (2004) (providing the United Kingdom's interpretation of the law of armed combat and listing other synonymous terms including "international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict," and "international humanitarian law"). 17 See Affidavit of Michael N. Schmitt at 1, United States v. Hicks, available at http:/ /www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2005/d20051006voll0.pdf [hereinafter Schmitt Aff.] (asserting that even though conventions require signatures to be binding, broad conventions followed by many nations create customary international law that remains binding on all nations). The Schmitt affidavit was written for the trial of David Hicks, an Australian detainee being tried by the previous commission system. See also Karma Nabulsi, The Law: ins ad Bellum/Jus in Bello, in CRIMES OF WAR 223, 223 (Roy Guttman & David Rieff eds., 1999) (adding that "military thinkers, backed by other scholars, emphasize that the laws of war are drawn directly from the customs and practices of war itself").
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The charge murder by an unprivileged belligerent illustrates the arbitrary nature of the military commissions. The legal situation surrounding the "War on Terror" and the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon has created questions unanswerable through codified law." 3 The issues became more complex as President George W. Bush continued to use war powers without a formal declaration of war, 4 which caused confusion regarding whether military law would be applicable during the "War on Terror."' 15 Murder by an unprivileged belligerent, like the charge of conspiracy used against Hamdan, is an unprecedented war crime absent from international law. International law governing the use of force in armed conflict is traditionally termed jus in bello ("the law of war"), or more frequently "the law of armed combat," and constitutes part of United States law.' 6 This framework comprises the body of rules that governs hostilities between States and hostilities within States.
Customary international law plays a significant role in the law of war. Various laws-of-armed-combat conventions compose a body of customary law that binds even non-parties to the conventions. 16 See Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980) (integrating international law into the U.S. common law by reviewing the history surrounding the adoption of the United States Constitution). See generally UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAw OF ARMED CONFLICT § (A)(1.2), at 2 (2004) (providing the United Kingdom's interpretation of the law of armed combat and listing other synonymous terms including "international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict," and "international humanitarian law"). 17 See Affidavit of Michael N. Schmitt at 1, United States v. Hicks, available at http:/ /www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2005/d20051OO6voll0.pdf [hereinafter Schmitt Aff.] (asserting that even though conventions require signatures to be binding, broad conventions followed by many nations create customary international law that remains binding on all nations). The Schmitt affidavit was written for the trial of David Hicks, an Australian detainee being tried by the previous commission system. See also Karma Nabulsi, The Law:Jus ad Bellum/Jus in Bello, in CRIMES OF WAR 223, 223 (Roy Guttman & David Rieff eds., 1999) (adding that "military thinkers, backed by other scholars, emphasize that the laws of war are drawn directly from the customs and practices of war itself").
For example, even though the U.S. is not a signatory to the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it concedes that the Protocol reflects the customary law of international conflicts. 18 In order to show that murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not a war crime, this Comment begins with background on the elements of the charge, including the definitions of "privilege" and "war crimes" in Part I. Part II describes the potentially lawful status of members of the Taliban and concedes the correct categorization of members of al Qaeda as unprivileged belligerents. After illustrating the charge's absence in both international and domestic law, Part III shows that the charge of murder by an unprivileged belligerent does not conform to any instrument or interpretation of law. Next, Part IV uses the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld to refute the charge while simultaneously using the case for guidance in the construction of a new trial system for the Guantanamo detainees. Part V explains how the Military Commissions Act of 2006 treats the charge of murder by an unprivileged belligerent. Lastly, Part VI describes the various court systems available to adjudicate the charge and ultimately argues for a new court system based on the U.S. courts martial. The Comment concludes that the executive overstepped its bounds by creating a crime that does not comply with international and domestic legal standards.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Privileged and Unprivileged Belligerency under U.S. Law and the Geneva Conventions'
The term "unprivileged belligerent" is related to the term "unlawful combatant," adopted by the United States Supreme Court in 18 
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For example, even though the U.S. is not a signatory to the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it concedes that the Protocol reflects the customary law of international conflicts. ' In order to show that murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not a war crime, this Comment begins with background on the elements of the charge, including the definitions of "privilege" and "war crimes" in Part I. Part II describes the potentially lawful status of members of the Taliban and concedes the correct categorization of members of al Qaeda as unprivileged belligerents. After illustrating the charge's absence in both international and domestic law, Part III shows that the charge of murder by an unprivileged belligerent does not conform to any instrument or interpretation of law. Next, Part IV uses the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld to refute the charge while simultaneously using the case for guidance in the construction of a new trial system for the Guantinamo detainees. Part V explains how the Military Commissions Act of 2006 treats the charge of murder by an unprivileged belligerent. Lastly, Part VI describes the various court systems available to adjudicate the charge and ultimately argues for a new court system based on the U.S. courts martial. The Comment concludes that the executive overstepped its bounds by creating a crime that does not comply with international and domestic legal standards.
BACKGROUND
A. Privileged and Unprivileged Belligerency under U.S. Law and the Geneva Conventions 1 9
The term "unprivileged belligerent" is related to the term "unlawful combatant," adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Ex Parte Quirin20 "to describe the German saboteurs tried by military commissions during World War II."2 ' Terrorists are better termed unprivileged belligerents because privileged belligerents operate during armed hostilities and within the law of war, while unprivileged belligerents operate outside the rules of war, whether in times of war or relative peace.22
"Privileged" conflict refers to the mantle of protection that comes with lawful combatancy under the law of armed combat, particularly combatant immunity.23 According to Article 4(2) of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (Geneva Convention III), to gain privileged status one must: belong to an organized group, belong to a party to the conflict, be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly, and conduct one's operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 24
Not all who fight in wars are guaranteed this privilege. For example, since guerrillas25 conduct war in secret, it is improbable that the group would comply with the wearing of insignia, automatically disqualifying them from Geneva Convention protection.26 Though Article 44 of Additional Protocol I relaxed the insignia requirement, it was recommended for rejection by the U.S. President.27 There are, however, other ways of gaining privilege outside "Privileged" conflict refers to the mantle of protection that comes with lawful combatancy under the law of armed combat, particularly combatant immunity. 23 According to Article 4(2) of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (Geneva Convention III), to gain privileged status one must: belong to an organized group, belong to a party to the conflict, be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly, and conduct one's operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Not all who fight in wars are guaranteed this privilege. For example, since guerrillas 25 conduct war in secret, it is improbable that the group would comply with the wearing of insignia, automatically disqualifying them from Geneva Convention protection. 2 6 Though Article 44 of Additional Protocol I relaxed the insignia requirement, it was recommended for rejection by the U.S. President. 27 There are, however, other ways of gaining privilege outside guarantee protection of Geneva Convention III until they determine the individual's status by a competent tribunal.33 But the actual nature of the tribunal still remains in the hands of the captor.34 The U.S. Army Field Manual defines a competent tribunal as a "board of not less than three officers acting according to such procedures as may be prescribed for tribunals of this nature."35 A military commission could potentially serve as a competent tribunal." The DOD did create Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), though it is questionable whether or not they constituted competent tribunals since they did not decide a detainee's entitlement to prisoner-of-war (POW) status, but whether a detainee qualified as an "enemy combatant."37
After the tribunal's determination, the detainee would gain or lose his rights accordingly.' Since individuals subject to captivity 33 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 19, 6 U.S.T. at 3324, 75 U.N.T.S. at 142 (emphasizing that status must be competently and fairly determined before an individual's POW rights can be taken away). 34 See GREEN, supra note 27, at 112 (providing that a captive whose POW status is in doubt will enjoy the protection of Geneva Convention III until his or her status is determined by a "competent tribunal," the nature of which is determined by the captor detainee who is determined not to be an enemy combatant will be transferred to their country of citizenship or other disposition consistent with domestic and international obligations and U.S. foreign policy."); see also Guantdnamo Bay De-of a detaining power retain the protection of the Geneva Conventions until determined otherwise, only an "unprivileged" determination would remove the POW protection of the Geneva Conventions. Ultimately, the term "unprivileged" refers to a status to be determined, not any particular crime.39 A combatant who failed to follow the law and customs of war, or Article 4(A) (2) of Geneva Convention III, may have committed a war crime as well.'"
Even if a belligerent is deemed unprivileged, he or she is protected by Common Article 3 to all four Geneva Conventions, which applies to the treatment of all persons no longer taking part in the hostilities.' By its very nature Common Article 3 applies to unlawful combatants and to "conflicts 'not of an international character"'42 since the International Committee of the Red Cross created the Article to "ensur [e] respect for the few essential rules of humanity which all civilized nations consider as valid everywhere and under all circumstances and as being above and outside war itself."' The International Committee of the Red Cross formulated a similar but more specific provision in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions." It similarly estabtainees Overview, supra note 37, at 99 ("Of the 38 detainees determined not to be enemy combatants, 23 have been transferred to their home states."). 39 Compare DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 31 (explaining that war criminals are brought to trial for serious violations of the law of international armed conflict itself, but the law of international armed conflict refrains from stigmatizing an unlawful combatant's acts as criminal and instead merely takes off the mantle of immunity), with A.P.V. Rogers, The Law: Combatant Status, in CRIMES OF W.AR, supra note 17, at 97 (asserting that noncombatants-those not directly participating in hostilities-who commit war crimes by directly participating in hostilities may be prosecuted for any attacks on people as common crimes, and that while their acts as noncombatants are, therefore not war crimes, their direct participation in hostilities is a war crime). 40 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 39 (acknowledging that ultimately privileged status requires adherence to the laws and customs of war, and if this is not properly followed, it is likely the individual committed a war crime). 41 
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4°E
ven if a belligerent is deemed unprivileged, he or she is protected by Common Article 3 to all four Geneva Conventions, which applies to the treatment of all persons no longer taking part in the hostilities. 4 ' By its very nature Common Article 3 applies to unlawful combatants and to "conflicts 'not of an international character '"42 since the International Committee of the Red Cross created the Article to "ensur[e] respect for the few essential rules of humanity which all civilized nations consider as valid everywhere and under all circumstances and as being above and outside war itself."
'4 3 The International Committee of the Red Cross formulated a similar but more specific provision in Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 4 4 It similarly estabtainees Overview, supra note 37, at 99 ("Of the 38 detainees determined not to be enemy combatants, 23 have been transferred to their home states.").
39 Compare DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 31 (explaining that war criminals are brought to trial for serious violations of the law of international armed conflict itself, but the law of international armed conflict refrains from stigmatizing an unlawful combatant's acts as criminal and instead merely takes off the mantle of immunity), with A.P.V. Rogers, The Law: Combatant Status, in CRIMES OF WAR, supra note 17, at 97 (asserting that noncombatants-those not directly participating in hostilities-who commit war crimes by directly participating in hostilities may be prosecuted for any attacks on people as common crimes, and that while their acts as noncombatants are, therefore not war crimes, their direct participation in hostilities is a war crime). 40 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 39 (acknowledging that ultimately privileged status requires adherence to the laws and customs of war, and if this is not properly followed, it is likely the individual committed a war crime). 41 49 See GREEN, supra note 27, at 292 (explaining that even though offenses against the Geneva Conventions are referred to as "grave breaches," they carry the weight of war crimes in international law). 
B. War Crimes
War crimes represent serious breaches of the laws and customs of war.
4 6 The International Criminal Court defines war crimes as "serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflict not of an international character." 4 7 Furthermore, violations that endanger protected persons, objects, or breach important values are treated as war crimes. 4 Offenses against the Geneva Conventions are referred to as "grave breaches," and are also considered war crimes. 4 9 The U.S. definition mirrors these definitions in the War Crimes Act of 1996.5 o Murder by an un- 45 Id. at 37. . 49 See GREEN, supra note 27, at 292 (explaining that even though offenses against the Geneva Conventions are referred to as "grave breaches," they carry the weight of war crimes in international law). 
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[Vol. 10:533 privileged belligerent must fulfill this standard in order to constitute a war crime. It merits notice that unlike most international law sources, the U.S. Army Field Manual does not require a "serious" violation of the law of war to constitute a war crime, any violation of the law of war will do.51 The Field Manual enumerates offenses, in addition to grave breaches against the Geneva Conventions, to serve as representative war crimes to guide adjudication if new types of war crimes arise. ' Though it is not unprecedented for a national court to find that a specific act is a war crime without international recognition, the rarity of such an event precludes customary use.53 War criminality is not limited to violations of customary international law, and includes applicable treaty law.54 Civilians are just as culpable for war crimes as soldiers.55 While analysis of war crimes allows for flexibility in interpretation to avoid needless pain and suffering in wartime, murder by an unprivileged belligerent does not embody this avoidance and intention.
Traps and Other Devices as amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996), when the United States is a party to such Protocol, willfully kills or causes serious injury to civilians. Id. 51 See U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, ¶ 499, at 178 ("Every violation of the law of war is a war crime."). 53 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 571 (illustrating how national courts found alleged war criminals guilty of war crimes during World War II unlisted in the charters of the international military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo). 54 See id. at 572 (showing that war crimes can be both violations of customary international law or violations of applicable treaties). 55 See id. at 573 (providing an example of the type of analysis involved in determining whether an offense is considered a war crime).
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Traps and Other Devices as amended at Geneva on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996), when the United States is a party to such Protocol, willfully kills or causes serious injury to civilians. Id. 51 See U.S. ARw FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, 1 499, at 178 ("Every violation of the law of war is a war crime."). 53 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 571 (illustrating how national courts found alleged war criminals guilty of war crimes during World War II unlisted in the charters of the international military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo). 54 See id. at 572 (showing that war crimes can be both violations of customary international law or violations of applicable treaties). 55 See id. at 573 (providing an example of the type of analysis involved in determining whether an offense is considered a war crime).
II. THE LEGAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA UNDER THE LAW OF WAR AND THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
Since combatant privilege is the central question in murder by an unprivileged belligerent, it is important to distinguish why members of the Taliban may be entitled to combatant privilege and why members of al Qaeda are correctly termed unprivileged belligerents. Al Qaeda's attacks on various military and civilian locations around the world categorize them as a terrorist organization.56 The Taliban ruled Afghanistan as a theocratic government until the U.S. invasion in 2001.57 The key difference being that the Taliban acted as a State, and al Qaeda did not.58
The White House press secretary announced on February 7, 2002, that neither Taliban nor al Qaeda detainees "will be given POW legal designation" under the Geneva Conventions."" Yet, the President failed to distinguish between the Taliban as members of the actual government of Afghanistan, and al Qaeda as members of a non-state entity. Furthermore, since both the Taliban, as the government of Afghanistan, and the U.S. were parties to the Geneva Conventions, their conflict constituted an international armed conflict to which the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law should have applied.6° 56 See Aldrich, supra note 32, at 893 ("Al Qaeda is evidently a clandestine organization consisting of elements in many countries and apparently composed of people of various nationalities; it is dedicated to advancing certain political and religious objectives by means of terrorist acts directed against the United States and other, largely Western, nations."). 57 Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987) ("Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in . Since combatant privilege is the central question in murder by an unprivileged belligerent, it is important to distinguish why members of the Taliban may be entitled to combatant privilege and why members of al Qaeda are correctly termed unprivileged belligerents. Al Qaeda's attacks on various military and civilian locations around the world categorize them as a terrorist organization.
5 6 The Taliban ruled Afghanistan as a theocratic government until the U.S. invasion in 2001."7 The key difference being that the Taliban acted as a State, and al Qaeda did not. 58 The White House press secretary announced on February 7, 2002, that neither Taliban nor al Qaeda detainees "will be given POW legal designation" under the Geneva Conventions." 59 Yet, the President failed to distinguish between the Taliban as members of the actual government of Afghanistan, and al Qaeda as members of a non-state entity. Furthermore, since both the Taliban, as the government of Afghanistan, and the U.S. were parties to the Geneva Conventions, their conflict constituted an international armed conflict to which the Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law should have applied. 6°5 6 See Aldrich, supra note 32, at 893 ("Al Qaeda is evidently a clandestine organization consisting of elements in many countries and apparently composed of people of various nationalities; it is dedicated to advancing certain political and religious objec- .. that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war"), with RED CROSS COMMENTARY, supra note 46, at 526 (indicating that terrorists do not comply with the combatant obligation to follow the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict), and id. at 526 n.27 (defining terrorism as "the systematic attack on non-military objectives in order to force the military elements of the adverse Party to comply with the wishes of the attacker by means of the fear and anguish induced by such an attack"). 62 64 See Schmitt Aff. , supra note 17, II 7, at 3 (specifying that an international armed conflict may involve non-State actors, but an actual international armed conflict requires at least one state on each side). 65 See id. 111 10-11, at 4 (applying a sine qua non of international armed conflict that an international armed conflict only began on Oct. 7, 2001 between the U.S. and Afghanistan). See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2777 (2006) (in order to exercise jurisdiction by a tribunal convened to try Hamdan, the offense "must have been committed within the period of the war." (quoting WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 837)).
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Al Qaeda's classification as a terrorist group also precludes its members from certain POW protections under the Geneva Conventions 6 1 because of their previous attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, the U.S.S. Cole bombing, and the 9/11 attacks.
6 2 Even while acknowledging that the U.S.S. Cole bombing was on a military target, al Qaeda does not constitute part of the armed forces of a State and accordingly, lacked lawful authority to carry out the attacks. 63 Hostilities with a non-state actor, absent any related hostilities with a State, cannot trigger international armed conflict. 6 4 Al Qaeda's attacks preceding October 7, 2001, and any attacks postOctober 7, 2001, without a clear, direct link to the armed conflict with Afghanistan did not constitute a international or non-international armed conflict.
6 5 Accordingly, members of al Qaeda do not qualify as lawful combatants under the law of international armed conflict and have been accurately described as unprivileged belligerents. 64 See Schmitt Aff., supra note 17, 1 7, at 3 (specifying that an international armed conflict may involve non-State actors, but an actual international armed conflict requires at least one state on each side). 65 See id. 1 10-11, at 4 (applying a sine qua non of international armed conflict that an international armed conflict only began on Oct. 7, 2001 between the U.S. and Afghanistan). See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2777 (2006) (in order to exercise jurisdiction by a tribunal convened to try Hamdan, the offense "must have been committed within the period of the war." (quoting WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 837)).
III. MURDER BY AN UNPRIVILEGED BELLIGERENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
War crimes involve inhumane methods of causing death, not causing the death itself, which is an inherent part of war. A comparison of the enumerated war crimes in each major international convention, court, and statute reveals that murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not listed in any international legal instrument.66 This confirms the belief that while new offenses violating the law of war will continue to arise with the evolution of warfare, the unilateral creation of a war crime should be looked at with a high level of scrutiny.'
Regardless of this evolution, murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not governed currently by the law of war. When a belligerent is declared unprivileged, international law removes the mantle of protection provided by lawful status under the law of armed combat.68 But when an individual is not a formal member of an armed force that is party to the conflict, he falls outside international legal protection.69 He is simply a plain belligerent or civilian and would automatically fall under the domestic rule of law, which 66 War crimes involve inhumane methods of causing death, not causing the death itself, which is an inherent part of war. A comparison of the enumerated war crimes in each major international convention, court, and statute reveals that murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not listed in any international legal instrument.
6 6 This confirms the belief that while new offenses violating the law of war will continue to arise with the evolution of warfare, the unilateral creation of a war crime should be looked at with a high level of scrutiny. 6 7 Regardless of this evolution, murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not governed currently by the law of war. When a belligerent is declared unprivileged, international law removes the mantle of protection provided by lawful status under the law of armed combat.
6 " But when an individual is not a formal member of an armed force that is party to the conflict, he falls outside international legal protection. 
A benefited player plays the game according to specific rules." A benefited player can be disciplined for breaking these specific rules. Breaking these rules constitutes a war crime.74 An unbenefited player cannot break these rules because he is not part of the game. If he kills someone, he will be subject to a murder charge under domestic law but not a war crime.75 A war crime inherently requires an overt infraction of the law of war, not just committing a domestic crime without combatant immunity, i.e. privileged status.76
A more perplexing issue arises after realizing that the DOD created the crimes and offenses under MCI No. 2 after the war in among nations and other individuals outside the law of war that promulgate attacks for their own ends, not the ends of a State). 70 See Schmitt Aff., supra note 17, ¶ 38, at 12-13 ("[T] he unprivileged belligerent who kills a combatant is subject to prosecution for murder pursuant to the domestic law of States with subject matter jurisdiction over the offense and personal jurisdiction over the accused."). 71 Cf. Geneva Conventions III, supra note 19, U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S at 138 (delineating the conditions necessary to qualify as a prisoner of war, i.e. lawful combatant).
72 See U.S. JAG OP. LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32 (establishing that the offense of murder, without privileged status under the law of war, is illegal under domestic law). 73 Cf. U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, 111 2, at 3 (stating that armed conflict is governed by the law of land warfare which includes law enumerated in legal treaties and customary law which may apply even if not enumerated in a written instrument of law). 74 See supra Part I.B (defining war crimes as violations of the law of war, armed combat, and Geneva Conventions). 75 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 234 (stating that domestically defined criminal acts committed by an individual without privileged status under the law of armed international combat removes the mantle of combatant immunity, thus placing the individual under domestic law). See also Mohammed Ali v. Public Prosecutor, [1968] 3 All ER 488, 497, 1 A.C. 430 (1969) (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) (appeal taken from Malay) (holding that two members of the Indonesian armed forces who committed sabotage while wearing civilian clothes in Singapore could be tried under Malaysian domestic law because they did not comply with the requirements of Geneva Convention III Article 4(A) (2) and were not operating as members of the Indonesian armed forces at the time). 76 See generally supra Part I.B.
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is enforceable when an individual does not have combatant immunity.
70
The simplest explanation predicates war as a game. Playing this game is illegal, unless you fulfill certain conditions that give you benefits. 7 ' Without these benefits, a player commits illegal acts (the domestic crime of murder) by simply participating (killing someone).72 Murder by an unprivileged belligerent is playing the game without benefits, illegal activity that places the individual under domestic law.
A benefited player plays the game according to specific rules. 73 A benefited player can be disciplined for breaking these specific rules. Breaking these rules constitutes a war crime.
'
An unbenefited player cannot break these rules because he is not part of the game. If he kills someone, he will be subject to a murder charge under domestic law but not a war crime.
7 5 A war crime inherently requires an overt infraction of the law of war, not just committing a domestic crime without combatant immunity, i.e. privileged status. 70 See Schmitt Aff., supra note 17, 38, at 12-13 ("[T]he unprivileged belligerent who kills a combatant is subject to prosecution for murder pursuant to the domestic law of States with subject matter jurisdiction over the offense and personal jurisdiction over the accused."). 71 Cf Geneva Conventions III, supra note 19, U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S at 138 (delineating the conditions necessary to qualify as a prisoner of war, i.e. lawful combatant). 72 See U.S. JAG Op. LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32 (establishing that the offense of murder, without privileged status under the law of war, is illegal under domestic law).
73 Cf U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, 2, at 3 (stating that armed conflict is governed by the law of land warfare which includes law enumerated in legal treaties and customary law which may apply even if not enumerated in a written instrument of law).
74 See supra Part I.B (defining war crimes as violations of the law of war, armed combat, and Geneva Conventions).
75 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 234 (stating that domestically defined criminal acts committed by an individual without privileged status under the law of armed international combat removes the mantle of combatant immunity, thus placing the individual under domestic law). See also Mohammed Ali v. Public Prosecutor, [1968] 3 All ER 488, 497, 1 A.C. 430 (1969) (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) (appeal taken from Malay) (holding that two members of the Indonesian armed forces who committed sabotage while wearing civilian clothes in Singapore could be tried under Malaysian domestic law because they did not comply with the requirements of Geneva Convention III Article 4(A)(2) and were not operating as members of the Indonesian armed forces at the time).
76 See generally supra Part I.B.
Afghanistan began. The DOD charged the detainees with offenses that were not war crimes at the time of their commission, constituting a violation of international (and domestic) ex post facto laws." Furthermore, even if a national court, trying an unprivileged combatant, finds a sufficiently-alleged war crime, the court cannot prosecute the accused under that war crime unless it was an offense at the time of commission.78
The DOD created the charge of murder by an unprivileged belligerent well after the invasion of Afghanistan" in MCI No. 2,80 making it impermissible to allow a detainee's prosecution under this charge. Furthermore, because of the ex post facto protections in the Geneva Conventions and other international law instruments, the charge is invalid and should not be evaluated by the "regularly constituted court" responsible for trying the detainee.8' Nevertheless, a nuanced view of war criminality during the war in Afghanistan requires an understanding of other possible war crimes, statuses, and categorizations that could be confused with murder by an unprivileged belligerent.
A. Perfidy
Perfidy is defined as "[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence."82 Con- 77 
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions
, 290-92 (1993) (defining the "[pi rotection from ex post facto laws" as a "guarantee [ that crimes and punishments will not be created ad hoc to be applied retroactively to particular cases" and stating that ex post facto protection is guaranteed by the United States Constitution, art. I, § 9, and by ninety-five other nations' constitutions). 78 See generally Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 397 (1798) (prohibiting the passage of criminal ex post facto law). 79 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the President of the United Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 7, 2001) (The U.S. informed the U.N. Security Council that it was responding with military force in Afghanistan in reaction to "the armed attacks carried out against the United States."). 80 MCI No. 2, supra note 8 (declaring that murder by an unprivileged belligerent is an offense on April 30, 2003, almost two and a half years after the invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001). 81 See Geneva Convention III, supra note 19, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138 (affording all the judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable to civilized people, which likely includes protection from ex post facto criminality due to its enumeration in the U.S. Constitution and 95 other national constitutions); see also Bassiouni, supra note 77, at 290. 82 Additional Protocol I, supra note 44, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 21.
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The DOD created the charge of murder by an unprivileged belligerent well after the invasion of Afghanistan 79 in MCI No. 2,8 o making it impermissible to allow a detainee's prosecution under this charge. Furthermore, because of the ex post facto protections in the Geneva Conventions and other international law instruments, the charge is invalid and should not be evaluated by the "regularly constituted court" responsible for trying the detainee. 8 Nevertheless, a nuanced view of war criminality during the war in Afghanistan requires an understanding of other possible war crimes, statuses, and categorizations that could be confused with murder by an unprivileged belligerent.
A. Perfidy
Perfidy is defined as "[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence. ' Yet, because perfidy relies on intentional subterfuge in order to kill, wound, or capture an enemy, it requires conduct beyond murder by an unprivileged belligerent. An unprivileged belligerent does not possess combatant immunity and other privileges inherent in lawful combat," but does not necessarily kill through deceit. Because the DOD alleges it is solely the act of murder itself, without privilege, that creates war criminality,86 an allegation of perfidy would require specific facts that an individual actively misled an enemy-outside the law of war-to actuate a killing.
B. Guerrilla and Irregular Warfare
The U.S. Army Field Manual states that "[p]ersons . . . who take up arms and commit hostile acts without having complied with the conditions pre-scribed by the laws of war for recognition as belligerents . . . 86 See MCI No. 2, supra note 8 (defining murder by an unprivileged belligerent based on the three primary elements of killing or severely injuring, lacking privilege, and occurring during an armed conflict). 87 U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7,1 80, at 34 (internal citations omitted). 88 Compare Baxter, supra note 25, at 337 (asserting that "genuine allegiance" and "licit and laudable" purposes in the view of the State that they are supporting would provide sufficient justification to preclude international criminality), and id. at 337-38 n.4 (noting that "[a]lthough some guerrillas may engage in . . . the war crime[ ] of murder . . . , it is somewhat naive to suppose that . . . guerrillas never devote themselves to the same missions as the regular armed forces [,] " so that guerrillas should not necessarily be considered "bandits" or "pirates" (citing Willard B. Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REV. 177,181-203 (1945))), with GREEN, supra note 27, at 117 ("Irregular forces and resistance movements are only protected so long as they satisfy the normal requirements for recognition as combatants . . . .").
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ceptually, perfidy is similar to murder by an unprivileged belligerent. Military manuals around the world, 8 3 including the U.S. Army Field Manual, 8 4 recognize perfidy as a war crime.
Yet, because perfidy relies on intentional subterfuge in order to kill, wound, or capture an enemy, it requires conduct beyond murder by an unprivileged belligerent. An unprivileged belligerent does not possess combatant immunity and other privileges inherent in lawful combat, 85 but does not necessarily kill through deceit. Because the DOD alleges it is solely the act of murder itself, without privilege, that creates war criminality, 6 an allegation of perfidy would require specific facts that an individual actively misled an enemy-outside the law of war-to actuate a killing.
B. Guerrilla and Irregular Warfare
The U.S. Army Field Manual states that "[p]ersons . .. who take up arms and commit hostile acts without having complied with the conditions pre-scribed by the laws of war for recognition as belligerents ... [are] not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war .
, "87 Scholars disagree whether guerrillas by definition violate the law of war due to their status and non-compliance with the Geneva Conventions' conditions for recognition as a privileged combatant. 88 Yet, ratification of Additional Protocol I does not require irregular or resistance forces to identify themselves. Irregular forces are only required to be under proper command, and 83 See generally HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 203-26 (summarizing the customary international humanitarian rules against deception through an analysis of individual States' military manuals). 84 U.S. Amv FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, 1 50, at 22 (defining perfidy as securing an advantage over the enemy by lying or breaching faith or "moral obligation to speak the truth" such as feigning surrender to secure an advantage over an enemy). 85 See supra Part L.A (providing background on the effects of lacking privilege under the law of armed combat). 86 See MCI No. 2, supra note 8 (defining murder by an unprivileged belligerent based on the three primary elements of killing or severely injuring, lacking privilege, and occurring during an armed conflict). 87 U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, 1 80, at 34 (internal citations omitted). 88 Compare Baxter, supra note 25, at 337 (asserting that "genuine allegiance" and "licit and laudable" purposes in the view of the State that they are supporting would provide sufficientjustification to preclude international criminality), and id. at 337-38 n.4 (noting that " [Vol. 10:533carry their arms openly, when attacking or deploying preparatory to an attack. 89 It is unlikely that the Taliban would fall under such a classification since members of the Taliban army were combatants of a recognized government (even if they were not recognized by the U.S.)." With regard to al Qaeda, the operations conducted by al Qaeda against the Northern Alliance could categorize them as an irregular force.' Although al Qaeda was located in Afghanistan prior to the invasion by the U.S.,92 its operations alongside the Taliban could confirm the presumption that the Taliban accepted al Qaeda's allegiance and fought alongside them in some instances." Therefore, if a member of al Qaeda killed a soldier during battle alongside the Taliban, he could be categorized as a privileged combatant. This is still predicated on compliance with the Article 4(A) requirements for privileged combatancy.94 Al Qaeda's terrorist operations outside Afghanistan flagrantly violate the laws of war and would immediately preclude them from privi- 89 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 44, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23.
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict.
Id.
Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries his arms openly: (a) During each military engagement, and (b) During such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate.
90 See supra note 57 (acknowledging the Taliban's recognition by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates). 91 carry their arms openly, when attacking or deploying preparatory to an attack." 9 It is unlikely that the Taliban would fall under such a classification since members of the Taliban army were combatants of a recognized government (even if they were not recognized by the U.S.).9° With regard to al Qaeda, the operations conducted by al Qaeda against the Northern Alliance could categorize them as an irregular force. 9 1 Although al Qaeda was located in Afghanistan prior to the invasion by the U.S., 9 2 its operations alongside the Taliban could confirm the presumption that the Taliban accepted al Qaeda's allegiance and fought alongside them in some instances. 9 3 Therefore, if a member of al Qaeda killed a soldier during battle alongside the Taliban, he could be categorized as a privileged combatant. This is still predicated on compliance with the Article 4(A) requirements for privileged combatancy. 9 4 Al Qaeda's terrorist operations outside Afghanistan flagrantly violate the laws of war and would immediately preclude them from privi- 89 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 44, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23.
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IV. MURDER BY AN UNPRIVILEGED BELLIGERENT UNDER HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD
While the Supreme Court did not directly discuss murder by an unprivileged belligerent within the four corners of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the opinion does provide a solid footing for an analysis of the charge.' Although U.S. military law does not consider the severity of the offense when determining a war crime,97 Hamdan established that an act does not become a crime without its "foundations having been firmly established in precedent."" Because murder by an unprivileged belligerent reflects neither the characteristics of any of the representative war crimes presented in the U.S. Army Field Manual' nor the war crimes recognized under international law,' the government did not make the "substantial showing" necessary to establish murder by an unprivileged belligerent as an offense violating the law of war.10' Murder by an unprivileged belligerent may be prosecuted as a domestic crime, not a war crime. i°2
The Supreme Court explained that while it is permissible for the government to try the alleged offense even if the charge is not 95 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 49 (asserting that "Al Qaeda's contempt" for privileged combatancy "was flaunted in the execution of the original armed attack of 9/ 11"). See also GOLDMAN & TITTEMORE, supra note 32, at 29 (agreeing with the President and Defense Secretary's depiction of al Qaeda as an international terrorist organization that conducted private hostilities against the U.S. for which they may be punished). 96 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749,2780-85 (2006) (providing an analytical procedure to determine whether an offense constitutes a war crime through the charge of conspiracy against Salim Hamdan). 97 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. While the Supreme Court did not directly discuss murder by an unprivileged belligerent within the four corners of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the opinion does provide a solid footing for an analysis of the charge. 9 6 Although U.S. military law does not consider the severity of the offense when determining a war crime, 9 7 Hamdan established that an act does not become a crime without its "foundations having been firmly established in precedent." 9 " Because murder by an unprivileged belligerent reflects neither the characteristics of any of the representative war crimes presented in the U.S. Army Field Manual 9 9 nor the war crimes recognized under international law,' 00 the government did not make the "substantial showing" necessary to establish murder by an unprivileged belligerent as an offense violating the law of war. 0 '° Murder by an unprivileged belligerent may be prosecuted as a domestic crime, not a war crime. 102 The Supreme Court explained that while it is permissible for the government to try the alleged offense even if the charge is not 95 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 49 (asserting that "Al Qaeda's contempt" for privileged combatancy "was flaunted in the execution of the original armed attack of 9/ 11"). See also GOLDMAN & TrrrEMORE, supra note 32, at 29 (agreeing with the President and Defense Secretary's depiction of al Qaeda as an international terrorist organization that conducted private hostilities against the U.S. for which they may be defined by statute or treaty,' the precedent must be "plain and unambiguous. "104 Even if a source does exist, it must satisfy the Court's "high standard of clarity required to justify the use of a military commission."1°5 In the Court's analysis of the conspiracy charge against the defendant, the burden was "far from satisfied" since that crime has "rarely if ever been tried" in this country and is absent from the Geneva Conventions and Hague Conventions.1°6
It is difficult to imagine that murder by an unprivileged belligerent would fulfill this burden without previous consideration by a law-of-war military commission.1°7 The government's difficulty in satisfying its burden is underscored by the charge's absence from customary international law", and from the law of armed combat.' Thus, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hamdan substantiates the fact that murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not a war crime triable by military commission. . 1°4 Id. (fearing that lesser expectations would risk giving the military a degree of adjudicative and punitive power beyond the levels defined by statute or the Constitution).
105 Id. at 2781 (determining that the three sources cited by the government to justify the trial of conspiracy in a military commission do not adequately meet the Court's standard). 106 Id. at 2780-81 (adding that other international law sources confirmed that conspiracy was not a violation of the law of war). 107 See generally MCI No. 2, supra note 8 (defining murder by an unprivileged belligerent for the first time on the instructions' April 30, 2003, release date). 108 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 574-99 (recognizing the absence of murder by an unprivileged belligerent from any war crime defined by a customary international humanitarian legal instrument). 109 See supra Part III (concluding that murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not a war crime under the law of armed combat). defined by statute or treaty, 0 3 the precedent must be "plain and unambiguous." 1 0 ' 4 Even if a source does exist, it must satisfy the Court's "high standard of clarity required to justify the use of a military commission." 1 0 5 In the Court's analysis of the conspiracy charge against the defendant, the burden was "far from satisfied" since that crime has "rarely if ever been tried" in this country and is absent from the Geneva Conventions and Hague Conventions.' 0 6
It is difficult to imagine that murder by an unprivileged belligerent would fulfill this burden without previous consideration by a law-of-war military commission. 10 7 The government's difficulty in satisfying its burden is underscored by the charge's absence from customary international law' 0 8 , and from the law of armed combat.' O 9 Thus, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Hamdan substantiates the fact that murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not a war crime triable by military commission. . 104 Id. (fearing that lesser expectations would risk giving the military a degree of adjudicative and punitive power beyond the levels defined by statute or the Constitution). 105 Id. at 2781 (determining that the three sources cited by the government to justify the trial of conspiracy in a military commission do not adequately meet the Court's standard).
V. THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS
106 Id. at 2780-81 (adding that other international law sources confirmed that conspiracy was not a violation of the law of war). 
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Because the MCI were based on the original presidential military order that has now been superceded, MCI No. 2 is no longer enforceable. It is replaced by the definitions in the MCA.'" Rather than retaining the charge of murder by an unprivileged belligerent, the MCA splits the charge into two war crimes. The first charge is the murder of protected persons,"2 a clear violation of Geneva Convention W,'" and the second, murder in violation of the law of war.114 Both apply only to those persons subject to military commissions under the MCA, defined as "[a]ny alien unlawful enemy combatant[s] . . . ."115 Since civilians, or "unlawful enemy combatants," can commit war crimes,' 16 these two charges follow the norms of international law using the prior analytical critique of murder by an unprivileged belligerent."7 Congress corrected the DOD's error in the MCIs.
VI. AVAILABLE SYSTEMS OF ADJUDICATION
A. Available Court Systems
If murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not a war crime triable by military commission, exploring other court systems will likely shed light on more appropriate options. Though it is possible for a national legislature to expand its definition of war crimes, the definition would only apply to its own nationals if it fell outside 112 See id. § 950v(b) (1) (defining "Murder of protected persons" as " [a]ny person subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more protected persons shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct"); id. § 950v(a) (2) (defining "protected person" as "any person entitled to protection under one or more of the Geneva Conventions, including-(A) civilians not taking an acting part in hostilities; (B) military personnel placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, or detention; and (C) military medical or religious personnel").
113 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 19, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 781, 788 (including the willful killing of a protected person as a grave breach of the Convention).
114 See MCA § 950v(b) (15) (defining "Murder in violation of the law of war" as "Dilly person subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more persons, including lawful combatants, in violation of the law of war shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct"). 115 Id. § 948c. 116 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 573. 117 See supra Part III (concluding that the primary discrepancy with murder by an unprivileged belligerent is its categorization as a war crime when it should be treated as a domestic crime and acknowledging that murder alone does not create war criminality, but murder in violation of other aspects of international humanitarian law may).
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Congress corrected the DOD's error in the MCIs.
VI. AVAILABLE SYSTEMS OF ADJUDICATION
A. Available Court Systems
If murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not a war crime triable by military commission, exploring other court systems will likely shed light on more appropriate options. Though it is possible for a national legislature to expand its definition of war crimes, the definition would only apply to its own nationals if it fell outside 112 See id. § 950v(b) (1) (defining "Murder of protected persons" as "[a]ny person subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more protected persons shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct"); id. § 950v(a) (2) (defining "protected person" as "any person entitled to protection under one or more of the Geneva Conventions, including-(A) civilians not taking an acting part in hostilities; (B) military personnel placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, or detention; and (C) military medical or religious personnel").
113 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 19, 6 U.S.T. at 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 781, 788 (including the willful killing of a protected person as a grave breach of the Convention). 114 See MCA § 950v(b)(15) (defining "Murder in violation of the law of war" as "[a]ny person subject to this chapter who intentionally kills one or more persons, including lawful combatants, in violation of the law of war shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a military commission under this chapter may direct"). 115 Id. § 948c. 116 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BEcK, supra note 48, at 573. 117 See supra Part III (concluding that the primary discrepancy with murder by an unprivileged belligerent is its categorization as a war crime when it should be treated as a domestic crime and acknowledging that murder alone does not create war criminality, but murder in violation of other aspects of international humanitarian law may). the bounds of international law."' Domestic jurisdiction over international law derives from the universality principle' 19 that allows federal courts to assert jurisdiction over crimes of terrorism, torture, and war.12' Assuming murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not a violation of the law of war, a detainee should be prosecuted under domestic instruments, which include the military's general courts-martial and federal courts.'21
The universality principle would allow the U.S. to try war criminals in federal court,122 including war criminals of both international and non-international armed conflict.' Universal crimes encompass such "common crimes as murder," allowing the U.S. to prosecute a detainee for murder by an unprivileged belligerent.'24 Comity concerns regarding federal court involvement in military affairs would also be inapplicable because, like Hamdan, Guantanamo detainees are not a part of the U. 122 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 604-05 (stating that universal jurisdiction is supported extensively by national legislation). States party to the Geneva Conventions are obligated to include universal jurisdiction in their laws for "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions in order to ensure that the world is free to try war criminals wherever it makes the most sense. Id. at 606-07. 123 See id. at 604-05 (stating that several people have been tried in non-international armed conflicts for war crimes as a result of the universal jurisdiction principle).
124 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (6th ed. 2003) (incorporating common criminality into the universality principle). the bounds of international law."' Domestic jurisdiction over international law derives from the universality principle" 9 that allows federal courts to assert jurisdiction over crimes of terrorism, torture, and war. 12 0 Assuming murder by an unprivileged belligerent is not a violation of the law of war, a detainee should be prosecuted under domestic instruments, which include the military's general courts-martial and federal courts.'
The universality principle would allow the U.S. to try war criminals in federal court, 1 2 2 including war criminals of both international and non-international armed conflict. 123 Universal crimes encompass such "common crimes as murder," allowing the U.S. to prosecute a detainee for murder by an unprivileged belligerent. 122 See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 48, at 604-05 (stating that universal jurisdiction is supported extensively by national legislation). States party to the Geneva Conventions are obligated to include universal jurisdiction in their laws for "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions in order to ensure that the world is free to try war criminals wherever it makes the most sense. Id. at 606-07. 123 See id. at 604-05 (stating that several people have been tried in non-international armed conflicts for war crimes as a result of the universal jurisdiction principle). 129 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790 (stating that any "departure[ ] from the procedures" of court-martial "must be tailored to the exigency that necessitates it" (citing WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 835 n.81)). See also Fidell statement, supra note 127, at 4-6 (asserting three proposals that would check the President's power to change courtsmartial procedure: (1) requiring the President to state with "particularity" the facts that render a procedure impracticable, (2) requiring that Congress be notified of impracticability, and (3) making an impracticability determination subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion or illegality). 129 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2790 (stating that any "departure[ ] from the procedures" of court-martial "must be tailored to the exigency that necessitates it" (citing WINTHROP, supra note 7, at 835 n.81)). See also Fidell statement, supra note 127, at 4-6 (asserting three proposals that would check the President's power to change courtsmartial procedure: (1) requiring the President to state with "particularity" the facts that render a procedure impracticable, (2) requiring that Congress be notified of impracticability, and (3) making an impracticability determination subject to judicial review for abuse of discretion or illegality).
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130 See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000) ("The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other Since war crimes are not applicable here, the unlawful belligerent should be prosecuted under domestic law.13' Under Additional Protocol I, international law prevails over national law in domestic courts, providing, at the very minimum, the fundamental guarantees delineated by Article 75.1" While it would be possible for an unlawful combatant to be a war criminal,'" crimes by an unprivileged belligerent fall under the domestic law in their country of capture.' 34 Ultimately though, the Guantanamo detainees will almost certainly be tried in the U.S. whether they committed a crime of murder under Afghan domestic law, or whether they committed a war crime of murder by an unprivileged belligerent, as the DOD asserts. The universality principle allows all States to punish in their own courts for both types of crime. ' Presumably, the Administration created the "war crimes" and "other offenses" in MCI No. 2 to prosecute the detainees under international law. This is a strong concern because U.S. domestic law does not apply to "enemy personnel" charged with war crimes' 36 and war criminality falls under the jurisdiction of several military and international courts.' Placing war crimes under international humanitarian law provides a flexibility that domestic military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals."). 131 See U.S. JAG OP. LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 16-17 (determining that even though murder alone does not qualify as a war crime under international law, it still requires prosecution under domestic law).
132 Additional Protocol I, supra note 44,1125 U.N.T.S. at 38 ("In order to avoid any doubt concerning the prosecution and trial of persons accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity, the following principles shall apply: (a) Persons who are accused of such crimes should be submitted for the purpose of prosecution and trial in accordance with the applicable rules of international law . . . ."). 133 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 234 (noting the possibility that an unlawful combatant may intentionally commit a serious breach of the law of international armed conflict). 134 See U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, Q 81, at 34 ("Persons who, without having complied with the conditions pre-scribed by the laws of war for recognition as belligerents . . . commit hostile acts about or behind the lines of the enemy are not to be treated as prisoners of war and may be tried and sentenced to execution or imprisonment." (internal citations omitted)). 135 Since war crimes are not applicable here, the unlawful belligerent should be prosecuted under domestic law.1 3 ' Under Additional Protocol I, international law prevails over national law in domestic courts, providing, at the very minimum, the fundamental guarantees delineated by Article 75.132 While it would be possible for an unlawful combatant to be a war criminal,' 3 3 crimes by an unprivileged belligerent fall under the domestic law in their country of capture. 3 Ultimately though, the Guantdnamo detainees will almost certainly be tried in the U.S. whether they committed a crime of murder under Afghan domestic law, or whether they committed a war crime of murder by an unprivileged belligerent, as the DOD asserts. The universality principle allows all States to punish in their own courts for both types of crime.' 3 5
Presumably, the Administration created the "war crimes" and "other offenses" in MCI No. 2 to prosecute the detainees under international law. This is a strong concern because U.S. domestic law does not apply to "enemy personnel" charged with war crimes' 1 6 and war criminality falls under the jurisdiction of several military and international courts.
1 37 Placing war crimes under international humanitarian law provides a flexibility that domestic military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals."). 131 See U.S. JAG Op. LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 16-17 (determining that even though murder alone does not qualify as a war crime under international law, it still requires prosecution under domestic law).
132 Additional Protocol I, supra note 44, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 38 ("In order to avoid any doubt concerning the prosecution and trial of persons accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity, the following principles shall apply: (a) Persons who are accused of such crimes should be submitted for the purpose of prosecution and trial in accordance with the applicable rules of international law . . "). 133 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 234 (noting the possibility that an unlawful combatant may intentionally commit a serious breach of the law of international armed conflict). 134 See U.S. ARw FIELD MANUAL, supra note 7, 81, at 34 ("Persons who, without having complied with the conditions pre-scribed by the laws of war for recognition as belligerents.., commit hostile acts about or behind the lines of the enemy are not to be treated as prisoners of war and may be tried and sentenced to execution or imprisonment." (internal citations omitted)). law precludes, such as "forum shopping" or a higher evidentiary standard.'" Both before and after Hamdan, international tribunals have been proposed to try detainees,'" which would present a good framework'" were it not for the U.S. aversion to international courts."' Another option is repatriation and trial in the court system of the detainee's national origin. This option presents a complex issue since a POW's release after the end of hostilities necessarily "implies that another state is vouching for their future peaceable behavior."142 Such an implication would be problematic for an organization whose command structure is unaffiliated with any particular State and stretches across many States rather than within just one.' 43
Ultimately, the end result will be political and not legal. law precludes, such as "forum shopping" or a higher evidentiary standard.
13
Both before and after Hamdan, international tribunals have been proposed to try detainees, 3 9 which would present a good framework 14° were it not for the U.S. aversion to international courts. 4 ' Another option is repatriation and trial in the court system of the detainee's national origin. This option presents a complex issue since a POW's release after the end of hostilities necessarily "implies that another state is vouching for their future peaceable behavior." ' 14 2 Such an implication would be problematic for an organization whose command structure is unaffiliated with any particular State and stretches across many States rather than within just one. 43 Ultimately, the end result will be political and not legal.' 4 , 1998 ), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/ USDe13_23_98.pdf (urging congressional support for a "no war nexus" approach to crimes against humanity in the creation of the International Criminal Court).
142 Hoffman, supra note 13, at 230 (explaining problems likely to arise from categorizing terrorists as unlawful belligerents rather than as POWs).
143 See DINSTEIN, supra note 23, at 49 (distinguishing between the relative uniformity of the Taliban forces and the "assemblage of Moslem fanatics from all parts of the world" of al Qaeda). 144 Compare In Retreat, ECONOMIST,July 15, 2006, at 29 (contrasting the Bush Admin-theory, any legal adjudicatory alternative to the commission system would provide justice and retribution to those detainees who committed crimes. Security issues, however, weigh heavily in the eyes of the U.S. government,"5 and compromise will be required to address those concerns while seeking an effective court for trial.
B. The Needed Modification of the Commission System
The court system chosen to try the Guantanamo detainees must comply with the Hamdan decision."' Congress must create "a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees that are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."147 While the Geneva Conventions did not directly define the term "regularly constituted court," there remains some guidance in the Geneva Conventions IV commentary, Common Article 3, and the International Committee of the Red Cross."' It seems clear that an assumption of substantive and procedural uniformity with a State's existing laws should be the overarching theme in a system created to try detainees, 149 istration's eventual concession on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions with the consistently measured approach of State Department legal advisor John Bellinger on the applicability of international law in the "War on Terror"), with U.S. Dep't of Def. Update -July 11, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/home/dodupdate/For-therecord/documents/20060711.html (asserting that the England Detainee Treatment Memo does not change any Defense policies as a result of the Hamdan decision because "the doctrine, policies, instructions, and procedures that have been in effect have always had humane treatment as their standard"). 145 See Donald Rumsfeld, Dep't of Defense News Briefing on Military Commissions (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/2002/t03212002_t032 lsd.html ("The commissions are intended to be different . . . because the [P]resident recognized that there had to be differences to deal with the unusual situation we face and that a different approach was needed. . . .").
theory, any legal adjudicatory alternative to the commission system would provide justice and retribution to those detainees who committed crimes. Security issues, however, weigh heavily in the eyes of the U.S. government, 4 5 and compromise will be required to address those concerns while seeking an effective court for trial.
The court system chosen to try the Guant~namo detainees must comply with the Hamdan decision. 1 4 6 Congress must create "a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees that are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." ' 147 While the Geneva Conventions did not directly define the term "regularly constituted court," there remains some guidance in the Geneva Conventions IV commentary, Common Article 3, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. 4 8 It seems clear that an assumption of substantive and procedural uniformity with a State's existing laws should be the overarching theme in a system created to try detainees.
son."' This standard would have allowed testimonial hearsay and evidence obtained through coercion. 157 In order to rectify the government security concerns with the military rules of evidence, the rules should adopt a system like that of Rule 92 bis of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.158 Rule 92 bis (D) and (E) require that a party seeking to admit any "transcript of evidence given by a witness" must "give fourteen days notice to the opposing party," who then has seven days to object. 159 The trial chamber then decides whether to admit the evidence after hearing the parties' arguments for or against admissibility, or requiring the witness to come in for cross examination. 160 Here, the admissibility determination would move beyond sole judicial determination while also allowing discussion of admissibility in camera to assuage security concerns. It would provide careful review of evidence obtained through means that "cast substantial doubt on its reliability" and are "antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings. ',lel It is unlikely that Common Article 3 would be subverted if the son." 1 56 This standard would have allowed testimonial hearsay and evidence obtained through coercion. 15 7 In order to rectify the government security concerns with the military rules of evidence, the rules should adopt a system like that of Rule 92 bis of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 1 58 Rule 92 bis (D) and (E) require that a party seeking to admit any "transcript of evidence given by a witness" must "give fourteen days notice to the opposing party," who then has seven days to object. 159 The trial chamber then decides whether to admit the evidence after hearing the parties' arguments for or against admissibility, or requiring the witness to come in for cross examination.
1 60 Here, the admissibility determination would move beyond sole judicial determination while also allowing discussion of admissibility in camera to assuage security concerns. It would provide careful review of evidence obtained through means that "cast substantial doubt on its reliability" and are "antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings." 6 1
It is unlikely that Common Article 3 would be subverted if the [Vol. 10:533 UCMJ were utilized to try "unlawful combatants." The procedures of the MCA are "based" on the UCMJ, 162 purport to establish a regularly constituted court under Common Article 3 of Geneva Convention 111,163 and provide congressional oversight over changes in procedures.'64 Detainees, however, are prohibited from invoking the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights,'65 may not view "sensitive" information against them,'66 and may still have hearsay evidence used against them. 167 It is yet to be determined whether the MCA will provide the necessary checks and balances to mirror general courts-martial. However, the Supreme Court specified that the treatment and trials of the detainees were to comply with Common Article 3,168 and it should thus act as a floor for the trials, and not a ceiling.
CONCLUSION
The end of hostilities brings even greater questions, especially in a rhetorical war like the "War on Terror." The questions surrounding the legitimacy of the commission offenses will undoubtedly affect future questions after the "War on Terror" has ended. For instance, determining an end to the hostilities would likely be a contentious issue since an agreement on the cessation of hostilities depends on the nature of the conflict in question.'69 Only then would questions regarding possible repatriation be raised.
According to customary international law, the U.S. government would be required to grant the broadest possible amnesty to the detainees for their participation in non-international armed combat (or those imprisoned for reasons related to armed combat) except for those accused of, or sentenced for, war crimes.'" However, the U.N. Security Council, among other national bodies, conshould be required to appear for cross-examination" should hinge on whether, without such live testimony, the court could still "ensure a fair trial").
162 MCA § 948b(c). 163 Id. § 948b(f). 164 Id. § 949a(d). 165 Id. § 948b(g). 166 Id. § 949d(f). 167 Id . § 949a(b)(2)(E)(ii). 168 
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UCMJ were utilized to try "unlawful combatants." The procedures of the MCA are "based" on the UCMJ, 1 62 purport to establish a regularly constituted court under Common Article 3 of Geneva Convention III,163 and provide congressional oversight over changes in procedures. 164 Detainees, however, are prohibited from invoking the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights, 16 5 may not view "sensitive" information against them, 166 and may still have hearsay evidence used against them.' 6 7 It is yet to be determined whether the MCA will provide the necessary checks and balances to mirror general courts-martial. However, the Supreme Court specified that the treatment and trials of the detainees were to comply with Common Article 3, 168 and it should thus act as a floor for the trials, and not a ceiling.
CONCLUSION
The end of hostilities brings even greater questions, especially in a rhetorical war like the "War on Terror." The questions surrounding the legitimacy of the commission offenses will undoubtedly affect future questions after the "War on Terror" has ended. For instance, determining an end to the hostilities would likely be a contentious issue since an agreement on the cessation of hostilities depends on the nature of the conflict in question.' 6 9 Only then would questions regarding possible repatriation be raised.
According to customary international law, the U.S. government would be required to grant the broadest possible amnesty to the detainees for their participation in non-international armed combat (or those imprisoned for reasons related to armed combat) except for those accused of, or sentenced for, war crimes. 1 70 However, the U.N. Security Council, among other national bodies, conshould be required to appear for cross-examination" should hinge on whether, without such live testimony, the court could still "ensure a fair trial").
162 MCA § 948b(c). 163 Id. § 948b(f). 164 Id. § 949a(d). 165 Id. § 948b(g). 166 Id. § 949d(f). 167 Id. § 949a(b) (2) (E) (ii). 168 (1977) (recognizing that a cessation of hostilities may take many forms under heavy dependence on the type of conflict involved).
